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Professional Knowledge, Expertise and Perceptual Ability 
Christopher Winch (King’s College London) 
I. Introduction 
This article addresses the role of perceptual knowledge (knowledge by acquaintance) 
in the development of expertise in professional contexts. It seeks to answer the 
question as to how, if at all, does heightened knowledge by acquaintance inform a 
high level of professional know-how? In many professional contexts, successful 
action requires the articulation of various epistemic capacities: to draw on relevant 
systematic knowledge, to understand the nature of the problem faced, to perceive the 
essentials in complex situations and to judge and then to act appropriately. The aim 
will be to bring together philosophical and empirical considerations to show how best 
to understand the ability to perceive the essentials in complex situations and how this 
ability bears on the ability to judge and to act appropriately in professional contexts.1 
II. Perception Plays a Different Role in Different Language Games. 
It is through acting on and reacting to our environment, natural and social, that we 
acquire perceptual concepts. We acquire them in a social milieu in which we learn to 
recognise and speak about those things in our environment that affect and interest us. 
The language games that we thus learn to participate in concern relatively permanent 
features of our environment, shared with others (Strawson 1961). The concepts that 
we possess of substances, processes, events and other people are acquired through 
action and observation, but necessarily also through learning our native language 
through interaction with adults. Perceptual concepts are acquired through social 
intercourse, rather than through introspection and labelling. They are made manifest 
through our attempts to communicate and to act on the world. They grow through our 
participation in normative activities (Baker and Hacker 1985) in which adults play a 
predominant role.  
We also acquire psychological concepts and concepts of sensation through the same 
means, but our acquisition of sensation concepts depends on our prior grasp of 
perceptual concepts. We learn about colour, texture, solidity, viscosity etc. through 
                                                          
1 The distinction between judging and acting in a professional situation is made to take account of 
‘knowing to’ examples (see Wiggins 2012 for examples). 
2 
 
2 
 
encountering objects, processes and events that manifest such properties and we learn 
the language of perception through communication with adults in the course of such 
experiences. Learning to report on our own states, using the same or similar 
vocabulary, occurs when we acquire the ability to apply to ourselves concepts that we 
first applied to our environment, to other people or which were applied to ourselves 
by others.2 For example, we learn the concept of an after-image after first learning the 
concept of an object, such as the Sun, which is capable of leading to such an after-
image. The range of concepts associated with ‘how it seems to me’ or ‘it looks 
different in this setting’ and so on are acquired after ‘it is an animal’ or  ‘the sky is 
blue’. The discriminatory power and the richness of our conceptual command grow 
through close engagement with our environment and intercourse with our peers and 
elders in the everyday settings of family and immediate environment; they are not 
first learned through introspection and reflection on our experiences, sensations or 
feelings, although these can play a role in further conceptual development.  
Those features of the environment that are most salient to us and which impact most 
forcibly on us and our interests, orient our enquiries and our learning. Our 
discriminatory and more finely nuanced conceptual abilities arise through the 
attention that we give to such matters as concern us most in everyday life. In addition, 
our curiosity about adult concerns allows us to build up a picture, albeit incomplete 
and sometimes distorted, of the conceptual structure of the social world into which we 
are becoming inducted (Tizard and Hughes 1984). Our orientation to the world is 
shaped by the impact of the environment and of others on us and by our curiosity 
concerning how the world works. We notice some things and not others and our 
orientation is a reflection of a discriminating and selective approach to the world 
around us that of necessity excludes and glosses over some aspects that do not 
concern us so deeply. 
The orientation to the world and the concerns of other cultures can take forms that are 
unexpected and difficult for us to grasp. For example, it is natural to assume that the 
part of our conceptual scheme concerned with colour reflects a universal human 
orientation and that, although we can expect cultural variation according to interest 
(for example heightened discriminatory abilities and an associated vocabulary related 
                                                          
2 See Child 2015 for more on the development of phenomenal concepts without the use of a private 
language. 
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to snow amongst peoples living in the High Arctic), we find it disorienting to have it 
suggested that perhaps concepts of colour do not exist or exist in a form substantially 
at variance to our own, as in the example given by Ma and van Brakel (2016) of 
ancient Chinese oracle bone discourse, in which   they argue that the perspective 
through which we should see what we call colour concepts in that outlook is best 
approached through what they call ‘cattle – fur – appearance –discourse’ (CFAD) in 
which the prominence of “appearance features such as the smoothness of the animal 
fur, its dullness/brightness, its chromatic hue, its being variegated or not, showing 
patterns or not, its appearance at dawn and similar appearance features, as well as 
related evaluative features” (pp. 274-275) are the appropriate way of interpreting a 
language game closely related to those associated with what we call ‘colour’. If this 
interpretation is correct, then the expert studying these oracle bones may require a 
perceptual orientation different from the ‘comfort zone’ of colour language games 
within which he is accustomed to think. 
III. Perception and Expertise. 
When we speak of expertise, we are not talking about this common world which we 
all share, albeit with different emphases and nuances, but of specialist fields of 
occupational activity the performance of which is appraisable, often to a very fine and 
discriminating degree, by fellow-experts. But such fields would not be within our 
grasp had we not first learned to operate in the everyday, non-expert world. 
Nevertheless, even within this everyday world, the site of our earliest actions, 
concepts of appraisal of action are important. Knowing how, as Ryle (1949) points 
out, is manifested in actions which are appraisable in terms of their technical, moral 
and aesthetic qualities. When we attribute expertise to someone, we build on already 
existing abilities to appraise action, abilities which are themselves an integral element 
in our concept of know-how. What is the connection then between our early 
perceptual abilities and our grasp of what know-how involves and the attributes of 
expertise that we value in professional activities?3 
In all human life there are divisions of labour. Some people do things that other do 
not, or do to a less accomplished level. This is something more fundamental than the 
                                                          
3 The discussion here refers to both constitutive and relative expertise – see Introduction to this 
volume. 
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modern organisation of work, it is a feature of all life; in the domestic, leisure and 
religious spheres as much as in the workplace.4 It is within the division of labour in 
which most of our activity is situated that we adopt a distinctive stance towards the 
relevant environment, the people within it and the instruments that we use. The 
division of labour orients us in certain directions rather than others and this is 
reflected in the salience which certain features of our environment enjoy relative to 
others, within the field of both perception and discourse. The two are intimately 
connected. For a carpenter, the workshop is organised with carpentry in mind. As 
Heidegger points out, for the carpenter, the layout of the workplace, the location of 
tools and materials are salient in a way that they would not necessarily be for a 
customer or a visitor. The salience of the workshop and its work-relevant features to 
the carpenter is a stance that the carpenter must perforce have.5  
This perceptual stance does not mean that the carpenter sees a different workshop 
from the customer or visitor, rather that the ordering of importance and hence of 
notice and attention are different for him. That this ordering is different is a necessary 
condition of his ability to act effectively as a carpenter. For him, qua carpenter, the 
workspace is organised in a way apt for the practice of his occupation.  The perceptual 
salience of carpentry-related phenomena extends beyond the workplace. The 
carpenter will notice features of other carpenters’ work in the wider world and will 
take note of materials, joints and other features of workmanship that will remain 
unnoticed by those not in his profession. Such stances are an unavoidable 
consequence of the division of labour and constitute the foundation of our ability to 
perceive and to make judgements about the actions of other workers in the same field. 
The ability to act appropriately involves perceiving and understanding the nature of 
the situation faced. It is thus brought within a conceptual field that frames the 
situation perceived by the agent and gives rise to consideration of potential courses of 
action, themselves constrained by knowledge of what is feasible.  
We have thus set the stage for considering the contribution that perceptual ability 
plays in acquiring, practising and judging expertise. A more or less permanent 
orientation of perception towards objects, events and processes that bear directly on 
the occupation is a necessary feature of practising that occupation to a threshold 
                                                          
4 See Weil (1955) pp. 133-4. 
5 See Weil (1978), p.50. 
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degree of competence, let alone to a degree of expertise.6 What Wittgenstein calls 
‘chronic’ aspect perception is not only one of the foundations of any expert activity, 
but is also characteristic of our everyday stance vis a vis the world or knowing our 
way about’.(cf. Arahata 2015, p.119; Wittgenstein 1953: e.g II. 180; 1980a: 295, 
1004, 1009; 1980b 458, 506).7 There is thus a permanence in importance of certain 
features of the environment that can be grasped, not just in what humans say about 
their environment, but also in how they act on and react to their surroundings, what 
Weil calls ‘une sorte de danse’,  the elementary expression of our perceptual abilities 
(Weil 1978, p.50). 
Although I have argued that perception primarily concerns how we relate to the world 
of objects, processes etc., we need also to be aware of the fact that we can also use the 
verb ‘see’ and its cognates to describe our experiences (see ter Hark 2015; McGinn 
2015). These two forms of perceptual language are closely entwined with one another, 
although the former is primary in the sense that it must be the ground for the other. I 
cannot talk about my experiences without using language and employing concepts 
that belong both to the public world and to what is perceived in it: objects, persons, 
processes, events, states of affairs etc. For reasons given by Wittgenstein, it is not 
possible to build up perceptual concepts ab initio through attention to my experiences. 
On the other hand, it is possible to use perceptual concepts to direct attention to how 
things seem to me, to how I see them as, what they look like to me and what 
possibilities are contained in them. 
Here there are cases that differ in important ways. In a certain light a tree looks blue 
to me, and there is no doubting that I am looking at a tree. Likewise, when I look at an 
object from a certain angle, something that is actually three-dimensional may look 
flat, but there is something which is actually three-dimensional. On the other hand, to 
use Marie McGinn’s example, I may see a resemblance between two faces. “I am not 
asserting that there is some demonstrable look that they both have and which anyone 
who sees them will see, but that I see or am struck by a similarity which I recognise 
                                                          
6 It is important to distinguish this kind of aspect perception from what Wittgenstein calls ‘continuous’ 
aspect perception, which occurs not just when I perceive the transition from duck to rabbit in, for 
example, the Jastrow drawing in Philosophical Investigations II p.194, but when I see the rabbit as 
long as my attention is focussed on it (see Arahata 2015 for a  more detailed discussion). 
7 Thus Ma and van Brakel (ibid.) speculate that the CFAD discourse is predicated on the salience of 
mammals such as oxen and horses in a particular form of life. 
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others may not see.” (McGinn 2015, p.41). McGinn goes on to point out that the 
criterion of my seeing the similarity is my sincere evocation of that similarity. That 
others do not perceive it does not detract from my claim. The criterion is not the same 
as for cases where I perceive something that is manifestly observable by others in the 
right circumstances, but does share this criterion with other cases such as puzzle 
pictures, imperfect sight, and aspect change (op.cit. pp.35 - 41).  
What is the relationship between the possession of concepts and perceptual ability? 
The everyday life into which a child grows up gives a pattern to experience which the 
acquisition of a conceptual structure within that life makes possible. Animals also live 
in a world in which those features which are salient for them give a pattern to their 
experience. They do not and cannot acquire a conceptual structuring of that world, but 
humans, like animals, form our conceptual structure around a more instinctive 
patterning which corresponds to our animal needs and preoccupations. Our growing 
participation in a social world is accompanied by a growing conceptual differentiation 
of our experience.8 This is not to say that we have a distinguishable concept for 
everything that we perceive, but rather that our experience is conceptually structured 
and where there are ‘holes’ in it, those holes are located in a common conceptual 
geography and can be ‘plugged’ through ostension or other means of drawing the 
attention of others to the phenomena of interest (see Luntley 2011 for example on 
‘activity concepts’). From initial concept acquisition comes enough mastery to 
account for concept possession. Specialist activity, driven through the division of 
labour referred to earlier, brings about further growth into what can be termed concept 
mastery (Winch 2016) which allows for the further fine discrimination of both the 
objects of perception and of our experiences of them. 
Continuous and transient aspect perception 
Wittgenstein’s later discussions of perception are best known for their focus on aspect 
seeing and in particular on aspect change, and to a lesser extent, on continuous aspect 
seeing. However, the cases that Wittgenstein draws our particular attention to are part 
of a larger concern to illustrate the variety of phenomena that we call ‘seeing’ (and by 
                                                          
88 Here I agree with Rödl (2016) that this unfolding potential is a human one, it is not a case of an 
neonate animal potential being changed into a human one through socialisation. 
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implication, hearing, tasting etc.).9 We should not, therefore, be fixated on the much-
discussed duck/rabbit case, but consider a range of cases relevant to our concern with 
perception in expertise.   
Let us begin though with aspect change. In aspect change cases, Wittgenstein writes 
about the experience of seeing something as something else, the example used in  the 
Philosophical Investigations being Jastrow’s duck/rabbit, which can be seen either as 
a duck or a rabbit’s head (but not as both simultaneously) (Wittgenstein 1953 p.194). 
Noticing an aspect change is a distinctive kind of experience, not to be identified with 
the particular saliences that the world as for us in terms of our natures and 
preoccupations (see above). There is an entanglement of perception with thought (PI 
II, pp. 211-212) and with the will (p.213). One has to think of the drawing as the 
representation of the head of a rabbit rather than a duck and this involves bringing 
into play elements of one’s concept of a rabbit (the shape of the head, long ears). 
Being capable of noticing aspect change presupposes prior possession of a certain 
concept or group of related concepts. It can also be that noting a change of aspect (eg 
from duck to rabbit) requires an effort of attention and concentration on the viewer’s 
part, something which is not usually associated with everyday cases of perception 
(although, as we shall see, very often associated with perception associated with 
expertise). Likewise with the case where someone has to ‘hold’ the duck aspect which 
constantly threatens to revert to a rabbit. Wittgenstein refers less frequently to 
continuous aspect perception (eg PI II, p.194), which are cases where a particular 
aspect is seen continuously over a period of time, without the experience of the 
dawning of an aspect. In such cases the temptation to claim that the Jastrow drawing 
is interpreted as, say, a rabbit, is dissipated since in such cases it is apt to talk of 
someone always seeing a rabbit drawing until another possibility is pointed out 
(McGinn op.cit. pp.42-43).10  
                                                          
9 See McFee 1999 for this important point. 
10 One case of interpretation would be where someone can see the Jastrow drawing as a rabbit but is 
unable to see it as a duck. I might say to such a person, ‘you need to rotate the drawing through 90 
degrees anticlockwise and now compare it with this Audubon drawing of an eider duck -  can you see 
that there is a resemblance here?’ The response might be either ‘yes, now I can see it as a duck’s 
head’, in which case she is brought to see the aspect, or it might be, ‘I can see what you are getting at 
– the drawing might be interpreted as a duck’s head because of the shape resemblance of the 
drawing to a duck’s head, but I still cannot visualise it as a duck’s head’. In this latter case the drawing 
is interpreted as a duck’s head, without being seen as such. The need to interpret the drawing in one 
way rather than another can be seen as an example of what Wittgenstein calls ‘aspect blindness’. 
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Having considered the most discussed type of case in Wittgenstein’s account of the 
complexities of perception, taking these as a ‘disorienting’11 starting point for 
considering the variety of cases of seeing which in various ways involve thought, 
imagination, will or memory, I will consider a wider set of related phenomena of 
seeing which are relevant to expert perception. Following McFee (1999), I take the 
spirit of Wittgenstein’s discussion to be the variety of interconnected cases, some of 
which he did not explicitly discuss but which illustrate his larger point about 
perception. We shall see that the aspect changing and aspect permanence of expert 
perception are not as important as some other cases. 
Seeing detail (this is a non-intentional case). 
The clearest type of case is that of noticing detail that others may not notice. This is a 
situation that will arise frequently in the contrast between an expert and a non-expert. 
The detail may occur in many forms, such as noticing hidden objects, fine shades of a 
colour or audial, olfactory or gustatory nuances that are beyond the range of the non-
expert. Although there are non-educated differences in our ability to see detail, there 
can be little doubt that we can be trained to look for detail in a way that would not be 
available to use without instruction and practice.  
Thus, artists can be trained to look out for particular colour shades and details of 
particular brush strokes, the biologist or botanist can be trained to spot detail in 
fragments of fossils,12 which the untrained eye would not be able to discern and the 
radiographer to spot patches in an X-ray slide which a layman would not see. The 
ability to spot detail is a fundamental part of the work of many occupations and it is 
frequently the case that sustained ability to discern detail in a situation or 
representation is critical to the development of expertise in a particular area. Consider 
the ability to note detail in microscopic slides for a biologist, slight changes of 
position of objects in a sequence of telescope sightings or subtleties of spectral charts 
for an astronomer or a particular sequence of leg and body movements for a football 
referee. This last example and that of the use of the telescope reminds us that the 
ability to spot detail in dynamic situations is often very important for the practice of 
certain occupations. In such cases the ability to spot detail in a rapidly evolving 
                                                          
11 ‘disorienting’ here refers to the use of examples that persuade us to see complexities in perception 
which we did not see before. 
12 See Gould (1989) esp. Ch.3. 
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situation (eg a game of football) leads readily to anticipation of what is likely to 
happen next, that takes the observer beyond the mere seeing of the detail. For example 
I see the actions of the players on the left and right wings respectively as the 
development of an attack. Thus, the ability to see detail can have a very close 
connection with seeing which involves imagination and thinking. In such cases 
material perception (seeing detail) easily slides over into a case of intentional 
perception (seeing an attacking formation developing), where the sincerity of the 
observer’s attribution is the criterion of occurrence. 
Seeing in. 
Another, related type of case which McFee, following Wollheim (1980, pp.213-216), 
calls ‘seeing in’ is also non-intentional in Anscombe and McGinn’s sense.  I see a 
nude lady in the painting before me. I see the arrangement of colour as a painting (I 
understand the representational conventions here: I have been brought up to regard 
paint marks within a rectangular frame as representations). I see the representation of 
the lady within the painting. I thus see the arrangement of paint as a representational 
object and see the lady situated within the painting (Wollheim and McGee refer to the 
twofold character of seeing in). This seems to be a case of material perception, where 
the object of perception is non-intentional. For anyone trained in the perception of 
representational art this arrangement of paint on the wall before me is a representation 
within which I recognise further conventions, thus seeing that there is a lady in the 
painting (discussed in McFee 1999, p.275). As McFee remarks, this type of case 
cannot be modelled as aspect perception. The ‘seeing in’ phenomenon typically 
occurs across a wide range of professional situations, such as the use of maps and 
blueprints. 
However, there are also cases related to seeing in which do seem to have a significant 
intentional aspect. In such cases, the seeing as locution may be more appropriate, 
although not in the same way as in the case of the duck/rabbit. These are cases where 
perception could be said to be entwined with imagination. McFee (ibid. p.274) 
mentions another rare case that Wittgenstein discusses.  
 
“But Wittgenstein contrasts the seeing of aspects, not only with (standard) 
perception, but also with another, rarer case typified by the seeing of a 
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triangle as having fallen over. As Wittgenstein says, more than mere 
looking and seeing is required here: ‘To see this aspect of the triangle 
demands imagination’ (PI, p. 207[h]).” (quoted from McFee). 
 
In this case, the type of  imagination employed is constitutive, the triangle is 
seen as fallen rather than upright, but it is still the same triangle in front of me, 
only constituted as being in a particular position. But there are other important 
cases where the imagination implicated in perception is projective, in this case 
the situation is deemed to be redolent of possibilities. We will shortly discuss a 
group of such cases in relation to expertise, where the possibilities are closely 
related to realisation.  
 
I want now to turn to a range of cases particularly relevant to professional expertise 
where know-how and more specifically cases of knowing-wh. are implicated.13 These 
cases illustrate a two-fold phenomenon; that of seeking something out through a 
process of intentional scanning or scrutiny and the fixing of an intentional object 
relevant to a professional purpose. 
Knowing what to look for 
There are cases where the intention in the perception is overt, where there is a 
deliberate seeking. This case of intentional perception is different, but related to, the 
case where the object of perception is intentional in McGinn’s and Anscombe’s sense. 
In this latter case, the object of perception is constituted through a complex of one or 
more elements of perception, thinking will and memory. In the former case the 
intention lies in an act that is not yet fulfilled. In these cases, the perceiver will 
structure the perception in such a way that his intention may be fulfilled. This will in 
many cases involve the ability to discern detail (see above), but will also involve 
intentionality in the sense that what is looked for (and eventually perceived) is an 
intentional object. This  (like the previous examples) involves awareness of salience 
in the scene observed, as in the workshop.  
                                                          
13 In such cases, knowing wh is to be interpreted as a form of know-how rather than propositional 
knowledge, contrary to much of the literature on the topic. 
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Research reported by Gobet (2016) goes into some detail about the expert’s ability to 
see possibilities and his analysis suggests that there are significant differences 
between experts and non-experts in the ability to discern possibilities for action. The 
ability to identify relevant elements in the field of perception and to relate them to 
each other in ways relevant to the agent’s objective is important, (‘chunking’). This 
ability is itself developed at least partially through experience either gained through 
previous professional action or through study (or both), and in particular the ability to 
discern likenesses to previously encountered or studied patterns is important (the 
construction of templates). The research reported deals in ‘freeze frame’ situations 
within an evolving situation (specific positions on a chess board). Gobet does not 
describe studies of expert perception in more dynamic situations, but it would be 
reasonable to assume that similar differences between expert and non-expert can also 
be found in these situations.  
Thus the chess player sees the board as a game of chess (an example of ‘chronic’ 
aspect perception) and looks at the strategic situation for Black. The chess player is 
looking for a crucial configuration on the chessboard that will enable him to press his 
own advantage. In Gobet’s phrase, the player is looking at the board in terms of 
chunks, that is, related parts of the board that are relevant to his objective (to achieve 
checkmate for Black).14 This may involve using memories of positions to situate a 
section of the board as relevant to the objective of the game. In this case, Black is 
thinking in terms of templates,15 or cognate board configurations relevant to the 
situation on this board. These chunk memories help to identify sections of the board 
particularly relevant to the intention. The chess player will then possibly see 
checkmate in three moves (he sees possibilities in the situation – he sees the position 
as mate in three moves for Black).  
These possibilities may or may not be seen by another player, but this does not mean 
that Black has to withdraw his claim, thus making it a case of intentional perception in 
McGinn’s and Anscombe’s sense. However, in this case there is a clear possibility for 
the player to get someone else to see the same potential through a process of 
reasoning. In this case he sees the position as mate in three moves and may persuade 
                                                          
14 Gobet 2016 p.53. 
15 See Gobet op.cit. for this term, by which he means using chunks acquired through previous 
experience reconfigured in terms of the actual situation confronted (op.cit., p.80). 
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another player to see this as well and, possibly to hold that perception over a period of 
time. Although the locution of ‘seeing as’ is quite natural in this example, it is a 
different kind of case from the duck/rabbit example, which contains an element of 
surprise as the aspect switches (Now I see it as a rabbit!), which as Wittgenstein 
observes (PI. II, p.197) makes the expression of the realisation of aspect change more 
like an exclamation than a description. Unlike this case, getting someone to see a 
position on a chessboard as Black to mate in three moves involves a process of 
persuasion. The dawning of the realisation that the position on the board contains this 
possibility is the result of explanation and persuasion.  
Knowing where to look 
The experienced chess player in the example above knows what to look for, namely 
crucial configurations on the board, relevant to the objective of the game. We could 
say that a dual intentionality of perception was in play in this case: the intention to 
find something which itself is constituted as an intentional object.  The chessboard 
example is a relatively stylised and circumscribed situation which is also static 
(although with dynamic possibilities). In many examples of a professional field of 
action, the situation is not closely circumscribed by convention, can be open-ended 
and is certainly dynamic. This does not mean that Gobet’s categories of chunks and 
templates are irrelevant to such situations, but that they are more complex and 
potentially difficult to bring under the agent’s control. Empirical studies are needed to 
examine whether or not conceptualisations in terms of chunks and templates have as 
good explanatory value in highly dynamic situations as they are in relatively static 
ones such as a chess game. 
Thus, compared with identifying a relevant chunk on a chessboard, the task of finding 
the relevant events, processes or states of affairs in the complex environment of a 
battlefield, a classroom, an operating theatre, a scene of crime or an accident, an air 
traffic configuration or a complex engineering operation will be less straightforward. 
In such situations, knowing where to look for what you want to find can itself be far 
from straightforward. However, a successful outcome will be the perception and 
identification of a complex intentional object which may be characterised in terms of 
possibilities (as in the chess case). Here again, thought and memory play a role in the 
constitution of the object of perception. It may also be that the situation strikes the 
13 
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general on the battlefield in a surprising way – ‘now I see his weak point!’, rather like 
but not to be identified with aspect change.  
The battlefield is more complex than the chessboard which could be seen as a 
relatively stylised form of battlefield. A military commander has usually to deal with 
a fluid and dynamic situation of greater complexity, as well as an opponent who 
reacts in real time rather than in turns. A battlefield’s spaces may not be so easily 
available as ‘chunks’, crucial states of affairs and events may be widely distributed: 
reserves to the rear, a diversionary manoeuvre in a distant corner of the action. 
Background knowledge of units in the field of perception will affect how they are 
seen in terms of capacity for action. The general’s knowledge of their morale, fatigue, 
endurance and tactical ability will all affect how he sees them as instruments of 
possibility.  
Thus, not only is knowing where to look in the first sense of ‘intentional’ more 
complex, but the intentional objects of perception (the possibilities for defensive 
action, for a breakthrough, for  a tactical withdrawal) may be more diffuse and less 
amenable to bringing to the attention of another observer. It may be quite natural to 
say that the general sees the battlefield as a field of various possibilities, but 
misleading or an exaggeration to say that he sees it aspectually in the sense of the 
duck-rabbit situation.  
Knowing when to look  
This is particularly relevant to dynamic situations: the ability to see that an evolving 
process has reached a certain point at which it may be anticipated that an occurrence 
will take place, possibly at a certain location. Like the examples above, perceptual 
scanning and scrutiny, usually of a dynamic situation, is involved which issues in the 
perception of a possibility (eg to make a cross in football) or a necessity to commit 
reserves in battle.  
In these cases, it is not as if the agent is not continuously engaged in perceiving the 
situation and indeed seeing it in terms of intentional objects. However, perception is 
also anticipatory, the agent expects that there will be a critical development and 
he/she is on the lookout for it and attuned to take action when it occurs. The ability to 
be on the perceptual alert for such developing situations is often an important feature 
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of expertise, marking off the expert from the novice or merely competent practitioner 
who again is unable to see the developing possibilities within a complex situation 
within his perceptual field. There is also in such perception an element of thinking 
ahead towards the possibilities which is itself related to the will (the desire to take a 
certain action when the possibility arises), and memory (using past knowledge of 
evolving dynamic situations) as clues to developments in the present as in the case of 
the templates that Gobet refers to. 
In the cases so far examined, the varieties of perception have not been seen as 
interpretations of what is seen, they are examples of perception, albeit intermingled 
with elements of memory, imagination, thought and will. But, it might be said, aren’t 
these just the resources that we bring to perception when we interpret what we see or 
hear as something? Then, what is the difference between perceiving an intentional 
object and interpreting what is seen/heard as something else?  
The general sees what looks like the chaos of a battlefield to non-military onlooker 
and interprets that as a threat or an opportunity. He sees the battlefield as redolent 
with possibilities and threats. Nevertheless, the general did not always possess this 
perceptual ability; as a young drummer boy, battlefields appeared chaotic to him. 
Greater experience taught him to see a purpose and sense in the complex events 
around him.  
When he went to the staff college he was given studies of battles, with maps and war 
games to help make sense of why events turned out as they did. He learned to 
interpret apparently meaningless situations as manoeuvres: feints, reconnaissances, 
assaults and retreats and alongside learned the descriptive language that belongs to 
military strategy and tactics. In due course the finely detailed features of the 
battlefield are seen for what they are: redoubts, natural obstacles, cover, lines of sight 
and the evolving situation is just seen as a flanking manoeuvre, an advance under 
cover or combined arms assault. The point is that sometimes interpretation of what is 
perceived is required to make sense of it, and even that sometimes the boundary 
between seeing something as something and interpreting what is seen as something is 
not always clear. We could even say that something like training, instruction and 
practice is required in order to make an interpreter into a ‘seer-as’. 
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 The example above illustrates that as well as memory and thought, imagination plays 
a role in the perception of such complex dynamic processes as a battle. Partly this is 
constitutive, where for example, the disparate aspects of the battlefield are seen as a 
unity (Ney at Quatre Bras, Blucher at Wavre and Wellington at Waterloo) and partly 
as projective, where Ney’s action at Quatre Bras can be seen as a movement against 
Wellington’s main army. We can envisage an experienced commander such as 
Napoleon, seeing the battlefield and its surroundings thus. A less able observer would 
have to have the scene interpreted for him. Wittgenstein relates imagination to much 
more than mental imaging, which is not even a necessary criterion of imagining 
something. The relationship is closer to that of how one takes things to be, not in the 
customary ‘chronic’ sense described above, but in the sense of seeing a situation 
anew, or realising the possibilities latent within it.16 
IV. Perception, Expertise and Professional Education. 
What conclusions can we draw about expertise in professional work and the necessary 
preparation for acquiring expertise? The discussion has emphasised the variety of 
perceptual phenomena that can occur in professional work, both intentional and non-
intentional. In the case of non-intentional perception (in Anscombe and McGinn’s 
sense) representational conventions are important: the drawing, the blueprint, the 
diagram, the map or the picture must be taken as such. Furthermore, the ability to see 
relevant features within the representation is important (Wollheim’s twofold sense of 
seeing in). The other important case of non-intentional perception is the ability to see 
detail and nuance whether it be in a real situation like a classroom, a surgical 
operation, a football match or an accident, or in a representation like a map or 
blueprint. The expert should not only be able to ‘see in’ – this, we can assume, is a 
prerequisite for any kind of competent performance, but should also be very rapid and 
accurate in locating and identifying detail in the relevant field. The expert 
microscopist and the astronomer should be able to do this and often to show 
                                                          
16 The empiricist tradition tends to think of imagination in terms of a] lack of vividness compared to 
perception and b] in the ability to ‘slice and dice’ imagery (refer to Hume’s discussion).  But Hume and 
Kant also thought of imagination constitutively as organising sensation into coherent perception (see 
Hume Treatise, Bk.I, Part IV, Kant Critique of Pure Reason, Analytic of Concepts, Chapter 1, Section 3). 
See also the discussion in Glock (ed.) 1996. Wittgenstein’s discussion, while keeping close the link 
between perception and imagination, downplays the role of imagery. However, the constitutive 
aspect of imagination is given its due through the discussion of ‘chronic’ aspect perception, although 
not in the quasi-mechanistic form to be found in Kant. 
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endurance and persistence in doing so over a prolonged period so as to understand 
dynamic phenomena as in the case of the biologist John Sulston or the astronomer 
Tycho Brahe. In such cases, the distinction between the intentional and the non-
intentional sides of perception is not always easy to maintain. Thus for example, 
detailed and repeated observation of the movement of celestial bodies will reveal 
interesting changes in position relative to other bodies which only very careful 
observation might reveal, but to see them as circular rather than epicyclical is to 
suggest a way of fitting the observed phenomena into a larger set of coherent 
phenomena which requires a shift of perspective from geocentricity to heliocentricity.  
Intentional perception is critical in understanding expertise. A permanent orientation 
to the workplace and the work, where work relevant features of a situation are salient 
to the agent is, again, a prerequisite of competent performance, not just of expertise. 
However, the type of case that Wittgenstein discusses at length, of aspect change and 
of holding an aspect, may occur relatively infrequently in professional situations, but 
may, nevertheless, be important. They may well occur in those circumstances where a 
change in perspective becomes important in solving a number of associated anomalies 
or puzzles, as in the example above.17 More generally, it may often be necessary to 
see phenomena afresh, not necessarily in the sense of finding more detail, but in the 
sense of seeing them from a different aspect, perhaps a theoretical perspective that 
alters a line of enquiry or even brings into question a system of classification and 
hence a conceptual shift.18  
The above example relates to the association of projective imagination with 
perception, but willing and thought may also play an important role in professional 
perception. We have already seen how percepts may be organised into structures 
informed by previous experience as Gobet and Keestra in this volume explain. The 
ability to see a phenomenon under one aspect rather than another as in the examples 
above may again require an effort of will to break free of habitual seeing. The goal-
directedness of much professional activity means that the agent is directed towards an 
outcome or a solution and this also informs the way that a situation is perceived, as 
redolent of possibilities perhaps or in a way that offers a possible solution that 
                                                          
17 Ref Kuhn 1962, 
18 The examples of whether fragmentary fossil remains should be seen as whole creatures or as body 
parts is discussed in Gould (op.cit.). 
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previous habitual perception of similar situations does not.   McFee’s claim that 
Wittgenstein was concerned with bringing to our attention a wide range of cases, not 
just those that he discusses in detail, is relevant here. What is very often important to 
the agent in a professional situation is the perception of possibilities in both relatively 
static and in dynamic situations. Possibilities are important because they are indicative 
of future courses of action, and often require immediate and decisive judgement and 
decision-making. They may also precipitate significantly different ways of regarding 
a situation, perhaps involving a conceptual shift in certain respects. 
Possibilities seen by one agent may not be available to another. One agent may 
persuade another that there are such possibilities and that different methods of 
persuasion may be necessary in different cases, ranging from ratiocinative (eg. going 
through the various positions for Black to achieve mate in three moves, to drawing an 
analogy between a current battlefield position and an historical one, to playing a piece 
of music in a certain way rather than another). We can also allow that the element of 
surprise which Wittgenstein thinks is important in the Jastrow case can also 
sometimes play a role in professional cases. The idea of surprise is a theme in both 
Wittgenstein’s earlier and later philosophy and relates also in the later work to the 
idea that manipulation of symbolism can surprise us by its result, even though the 
result is immanent in a formula.19 Wittgenstein then extends this idea to the ways in 
which other kinds of representation can induce surprise and we can further extend to 
cases, relevant to professional action, where there can be different ways of seeing a 
situation. ‘Yes, now I can see the injury as other-inflicted rather than self-inflicted!’; 
“now I can see an opportunity for a breakthrough in the undefended section between 
the wood and the stream!’ and ‘yes, I can hear the melancholy in the piece that you 
have just played!’ 
Wittgenstein draws attention to the involvement of thought and the will in certain 
kinds of perception and, in some cases, to the involvement of imagination as in the 
fallen triangle case. But we can go further in showing how perception is involved with 
other mental phenomena in professional judgement. As well as the constitutive 
imagination case, where the triangle is seen as upright rather than fallen over, the 
projective imagination is important, sometimes in anticipating how a situation is about 
                                                          
19 See Floyd (2017) for a further explanation of the role of surprise in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
mathematics. 
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to evolve and sometimes in discerning promising lines of action in evolving 
situations.20 But we can also note the role that memory plays in professional 
perception and the ways in which current situations can display similarities to 
situations previously encountered or studied, thus helping to disclose their 
possibilities for the agent’s judgement or intervention. Here experience can play an 
important role, providing templates in Gobet’s sense which combine the use of 
chunks (configurations dependent on memory), with re-arrangement to cope with a 
new situation (templates), thus showing how thinking is entangled with perceiving in 
such situations.  
Thus, to describe (relative) expertise in terms of intuitive fluency as in the work of 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus is to oversimplify. Although the use of templates can sometimes 
happen in a way consistent with their own descriptions, it may also involve a more 
extended re-arrangement of phenomena, tracking between what is seen, what is 
known theoretically and what the phenomena might look like if they were seen in a 
different context, or as part of a different development. 
V. Implications for Professional Education 
I want to conclude with some brief comments on the implications of these 
considerations of perception for professional education. The thrust of these comments 
concerns the need for awareness of the development of perceptual ability in the 
transition from novicehood to expert in the construction of programmes of both initial 
and continuing professional education. Much of this is no doubt already done in high-
quality programmes, but by making the different dimensions of perception explicit, 
the likelihood that critical elements in the development of expertise will be omitted is 
reduced. 
The first point concerns the aims of professional education in relation to perceptual 
ability. Here it is necessary to state that the development of perceptual ability at all 
stages of professional education is a necessary part of the development of expertise. 
Stating this as an aim marks its importance. Second, the place of the development of 
perceptual ability in its different aspects needs to be explicitly set out in curriculum 
                                                          
20 Another example would be the extrapolation of a peasant woman’s life form the depiction of a pair 
of shoes in Mulhall (1990), where the projection is more aesthetic and tenuously extrapolatory. But 
such a projection may nevertheless have a role in professional work and have the potential for 
productive surprise. 
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documents so that educators can see clearly what abilities are to be developed and 
when. Third, the pedagogical implications need to be made clear. Even though for 
example the development of perceptual ability and concept mastery may be different 
aspects of the curriculum, it does not follow that they are not to be developed together 
in an integrated way. Although there is not the space here to develop this point, it is 
likely that success comes from the pedagogical integration of these and other abilities. 
It is also a clear pedagogical implication of what has been argued above that various 
kinds of experiences are necessary to the development of perceptual ability, including 
theoretical instruction (e.g. in the important templates to be encountered) and various 
controlled and subsequently operational situations in which the relevant abilities can 
be developed progressively. 
Fourth, the right resources need to be provided in order to ensure that such abilities 
are developed. These will include equipment of the right kind, but also the ability to 
engage in simulated and non-simulated environments in which the development of 
such abilities is made possible. Fifth and finally, assessment of perceptual ability 
needs to be built into processes of professional qualification and, since the 
qualification is the final guarantee of competence or expertise, assessment needs to 
include the scrutiny of perceptual ability in operational conditions, as well as an 
assessment of how the candidate is likely to react in hypothetical circumstances.   
It is probably true that many qualifications and assessment criteria do not dwell 
explicitly on this aspect of operational work except in an informal way in, for 
example, the assessment of a student’s performance in a teaching practice. One is 
looking here for, not just the ability to see detail in a classroom situation, although 
this will be important, but also an ability to perceive latency (what might develop) and 
immanence (what is significant about an apparently banal event). These are more than 
just exercising ‘perceptual skills’, but relate to the ability to focus attention and to 
take seriously the significance of certain patterns, involving the memory and 
imagination of the agent. Although the criteria for determining that someone 
appreciates these subtle phenomena are ultimately the product of a settled practice of 
judgement of teaching ability, it is also important that they be formally articulated in 
an assessment procedure, both to ensure against the case where they are altogether 
omitted, to eliminate simple reliance on intersubjectice agreement and to make clear 
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to both assessor and candidate that they will be significant (see the discussion of 
criteria for assessment in the Introduction to this volume). 
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